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WAR AND SCHOOLING  
IN SOUTH SUDAN, 2013-2016
Augustino Ting Mayai
ABSTRACT
South Sudan was embroiled in a civil war from mid-December 2013 to mid-
September 2018. Nearly 400,000 people died, and several million were displaced. 
The economy nearly collapsed as the nation’s output was severely reduced, causing 
inflation to soar. While prior research on the immediate humanitarian crisis in 
South Sudan has focused on forced displacement and food insecurity, there is little 
information available about the long-term impact the war had on human capital 
accumulation in this context. This analysis exploits spatial variation in exposure 
to violence to estimate the causal impact of the recent civil war on primary school 
enrollment as a proxy for measuring human capital accumulation. Results based 
on the difference-in-differences methodology indicate a statistically significant 
relationship between school enrollment and the war. The study shows that schools 
located in the South Sudanese war zones lost 85 children per year on average, or 
18.5 percent of total enrollment. The diminishing trends in girls’ enrollment are 
unrelated to the war, which is not surprising; social barriers, including gendered 
domestic roles, early marriage, and out-of-wedlock pregnancies, have long impeded 
female educational opportunities in South Sudan. These effects are robust to a 
number of specifications, including holding constant school-level fixed effects and 
adjusting for the standard errors. The article presents important policy implications 
for education and the labor market, both locally and internationally. 
INTRODUCTION 
In December 2013, a little more than two years after it gained independence 
from Sudan, a civil war broke out in South Sudan. The violence quickly elevated 
in intensity and area, threatening what little progress the country had made 
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during a wobbly transition. The resultant humanitarian situation was considered 
catastrophic, with millions of people displaced and nearly half the new nation’s 
population facing a severe food shortage (IPC 2017). The destruction of physical 
capital in recent years thwarted the fundamental development process in South 
Sudan, with basic services gravely affected (Mayai and Hammond 2014; Addison 
et al. 2015; Lai and Thyne 2007; Burde et al. 2017). This included institutions in 
the education sector, which struggled to perform their duties as learning facilities, 
became homes for armed groups, were destroyed, or closed down. This forced 
some 400,000 children in three states to drop out of school (Hodgkin and Thomas 
2016; Lai and Thyne 2007). 
The civil war also caused a drastic disruption of economic activity. Breckenridge 
(2014) estimated that South Sudan could lose up to US$28 billion if the war 
continued for more than five years, mainly via a decline in oil production and 
trade. Indeed, in the course of the war, South Sudan’s monthly revenue declined 
from hundreds of millions to just US$20 million (Ministry of Finance and 
Planning 2017). 
The war significantly threatened human capital investment in South Sudan and 
put future socioeconomic development at risk. Investment in education, training, 
and health care in South Sudan was always modest, but it was nearly crowded out 
by spending on defense and security during the war (Mayai and Hammond 2014; 
Poirier 2012), thereby weakening prospects for skills development and economic 
growth (Schultz 1980; Becker 1994; Barro 1999). These deficits in education and 
training have left postconflict South Sudan without the productive capacities 
it needs to manage its long-term development and economic aspirations. They 
also have important implications for human capital accumulation—essentially an 
investment in people—which is critical for development, due to its importance 
to labor output and the generation of economically stimulating ideas (Schultz 
1960, 1980).
There has been marked interest, both locally and internationally, in understanding 
how to respond to South Sudan’s tragic humanitarian crisis and the economic 
upheaval caused by the war, particularly the alarming food insecurity and far-
reaching socioeconomic consequences (Mayai et al. 2017; IPC 2017). Research 
commissioned in response to the emergency has often focused largely on the 
adverse short-term effects of war-induced shocks, but this humanitarian-driven 
research agenda offers little insight into the long-term deficits in human capacity 
and skill development that South Sudan must now confront (Brown 2006). Another 
strand of research has focused mainly on the correlation between schooling and 
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political stability, citing in particular how certain education policies excite or 
perpetuate grievances (Burde et al. 2017). However, little is understood as yet 
about the extent to which South Sudan’s civil war has impacted human capital 
accumulation, especially as it concerns the spatial (i.e., in the states) and gender 
distribution of such effects. 
Fortunately, data from the Assessment Capacities Project (ACAPS) have helped fill 
this gap, as they retrospectively track primary school enrollment in South Sudan 
to a prewar time, when the new country was relatively stable. Using these data, 
supplemented with Armed Conflict Location Event Data (ACLED) on conflict 
intensity, we explore the nexus between primary school enrollment as a measure 
of human capital accumulation and the civil war in South Sudan. Our analysis 
addresses two main research questions: To what extent did South Sudan’s civil 
war affect primary school enrollment? And is the outcome gender differentiated? 
Human capital accumulation in this case is measured as the average number 
of children enrolled annually in primary school. Primary school attainment is 
not often used as a predictor of socioeconomic outcomes, particularly income. 
However, primary education is an important point of departure into higher 
learning, which is associated with significant economic gain (Schultz 1988; Card 
1994), thus, primary education in developing countries can have a sizable influence 
on earnings. Research shows, for example, that an additional year of primary 
education in such contexts accounts for a 10 percent rise in later wages (Klenow 
and Rodriguez-Clare 1997; Mincer 1974). Therefore, as an economic enabler, 
primary education is as significant in settings where literacy rates are relatively 
low as secondary or higher education is in more developed settings, making it an 
imperative human capital constituent. Similarly, we made the decision to examine 
primary school enrollment, rather than secondary school or higher education, 
because of the availability of new, more reliable data. 
We assess two hypotheses pertaining to the war in South Sudan and its human 
capital consequences. First, we expect enrollment to decline in schools directly 
exposed to the recent war, most of which suffered infrastructural damage, the flight 
of staff, and a drastic reduction in instructional activities (Mayai and Hammond 
2014; Addison et al. 2015; Lai and Thyne 2007; Burde et al. 2017). Second, we expect 
the war’s impact on school enrollment to be more pronounced for male than female 
children (Burde et al. 2017; Kirk and Winthrop 2007; Lai and Thyne 2007). 
There are decisive ways a war can undermine the education process (Akbulut-
Yuksel 2009; León 2012). First, due to the threat of violence, schools in war 
zones are likely to be closed or destroyed (Guariso and Verpoorten 2013). Second, 
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parents are likely to pull their children out of a school in a threatened area and 
move them to a safer location, whether or not the new location has a school. 
Third, displaced people lose their income, which negatively affects their ability to 
pay for their children’s education. That is, a substantial decline in enrollment is 
expected during a conflict, given the high level of forced displacement. Moreover, 
youth recruitment into armed forces is ubiquitous in such contexts (Wessells 
2002; Lai and Thyne 2007), and prior studies indicate that male children are more 
likely than female children to be conscripted (Achvarina and Reich 2006; Lai and 
Thyne 2007). Using children as combatants increases the number of out-of-school 
children and clearly interferes with their schooling (León 2012; Wessells 2002; 
Guariso and Verpoorten 2013). 
Our identification strategy relies on the following four assumptions. First, exposure 
to political violence varies by geography, represented in this study by individual 
states. Our model stratifies schools into locations (states) affected and not affected 
by conflict. Second, exploiting location-specific exposure to war permits use of 
the difference-in-differences (DD) approach to estimate an exogenous variation 
in enrollment between two groups of schools (1 if exposed to war, 0 if not). 
Third, South Sudan, being recently independent, is an instructive context for 
studying gender difference relative to the war’s effect on school enrollment. 
Finally, South Sudan is undergoing a dramatic political transformation, making 
it a suitable context for studying the impact of political violence on human capital 
accumulation in the 21st century. Given this unique moment in the country’s 
history, lessons from South Sudan could be used to promote the UN Sustainable 
Development Goals, which advocate for a substantial increase in the number of 
young adults with the skills and knowledge to meet the 21st century’s economic 
demands (UN Economic and Social Council 2017).
With this study, we provide instructive insights into educational returns to political 
violence in South Sudan and complement the prevailing literature on education 
processes in emergencies (Talbot 2013). Given the interplay between education and 
conflict, analysis of education in emergency contexts is essential to determining 
the conditions most conducive to future socioeconomic development and political 
stability (Burde et al. 2017; Lloyd et al. 2010). Education is an equalizer on the 
socioeconomic development front, as it enables individuals to help build societies 
and improve their personal wellbeing (Haveman and Smeeding 2006), and it is 
critical to stability, as it influences the way societies deal with violence. Research 
shows an appreciable decline in violence in a given society as the number of 
educated people increases (Gillis 1994). This means that minimizing inequalities 
in education can reduce group-based grievances, ease resulting tensions, and 
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possibly engender a more stable state (Burde et al. 2017). Our analysis, therefore, 
presents empirical evidence to guide local and international policymaking on 
education processes in emergency situations, with a focus on the present and 
future socioeconomic challenges people in emergency contexts are likely to 
grapple with during an unstable time and after stability has been restored.
This work adds to existing research in three important ways. First, by using impact 
evaluation techniques to estimate the causal impact of war on schooling in South 
Sudan, this study contributes to a growing literature on education processes in 
emergencies. Second, this study is the first of its kind, in that it exploits school-
level panel data to estimate the average treatment impact of war on primary school 
enrollment, specifically in South Sudan and more generally in East Africa. Lastly, 
the study assesses the causal impact of political violence on school enrollment in 
a context where prior research of this kind is scarce. 
The present analysis shows that, although there has been a general surge in 
primary school enrollment in South Sudan since 2015, the war is associated 
with considerably reduced school enrollment in locations directly exposed to the 
conflict. From 2013 to 2016, the schools examined lost on average more than 80 
children each, or 18.5 percent of total annual enrollment. With 70 percent of the 
former ten states directly affected, the overall long-term effect the war has had 
on schooling in South Sudan could be overwhelming.1 
Against this backdrop, the remainder of this study proceeds as follows: section two 
summarizes the history of the civil war in South Sudan; section three reviews the 
literature on the subject; section four presents materials and analytical strategies; 
section five presents our results, which are then discussed in section six. 
LEGACIES OF CIVIL WAR IN SOUTH SUDAN
Having gained independence from Sudan in 2011, South Sudan is still in the 
process of forming as a stable state. Its institutions have long been overshadowed 
by personalized politics, with political elites often mired in power squabbles. 
This infighting enabled the elites to overtly ignore the conventional instruments 
of governance, including the new nation’s constitution, in running state affairs 
(Awolich and Akol 2013). The result has been protracted violent conflicts of 
varying magnitude throughout the country. 
1  In 2015, a presidential decree created 28 states out of the original 10; in February 2020, this decision 
was reversed, with the country returned to previous 10 states. 
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In December 2013, a disagreement among leaders in the governing political party, 
the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), sparked deadly violence in Juba, 
the nation’s capital. Within a short time, the war had spread to at least four more 
states, with masses of people, both combatants and civilians, killed or forced to 
flee to internationally protected encampments (Checchi et al. 2018). Although the 
degree of destruction varied, basic infrastructure such as schools, government 
buildings, health-care facilities, and essential economic systems were severely 
damaged across the affected states. In the education sector alone, the conflict 
caused 70 percent of schools to close in the states of Jonglei, Upper Nile, and Unity, 
and as many as 400,000 children dropped out of school (Hodgkin and Thomas 
2016). Traditional livelihoods in those states were also significantly disrupted. 
The impact of the war on South Sudan’s macro economy was also overwhelming. 
Oil production plummeted, foreign investors fled, and millions of citizens lost 
their basic livelihoods, ending up as refugees or as internally displaced persons 
(IDPs). This widespread insecurity resulted in low economic activity, even at the 
subsistence level. The price of goods skyrocketed, but wages were not adjusted 
accordingly; as a result, the number of people living below the poverty line 
increased while purchasing power declined (Reng and Mayai 2016; Shimeles 
and Verdier-Chouchane 2016). As of late 2017, the country’s overall consumer 
price index stood at 272 percent, 267 percent for food alone (NBS 2017), and 
the World Bank projected that South Sudan’s 2017 real gross domestic product 
would shrink by 10.5 percent. The high inflation was due chiefly to shocks in 
the commodity market caused by the war. The conflict also constrained South 
Sudan’s trade with neighboring states, particularly Uganda (Mayer and Thoenig 
2016), which proved tragic for a country that depends on imports for essentially 
all consumable goods and services. 
As oil production fell, South Sudan turned to its meager foreign reserves and 
depleted them through spending on defense and security, meanwhile sparing 
only limited funds for food, medical needs, and energy imports. Moreover, South 
Sudan no longer receives development aid, which has compounded the country’s 
fiscal burden, and it is now struggling to raise sufficient revenue to meet its fiscal 
obligations, especially for basic services. 
After the civil war broke out in 2013, two million South Sudanese became 
internally displaced, 1.9 million sought refuge in neighboring countries, and, as 
of 2017, an estimated 5.5 million people were facing critical food shortages. In 
2017, the United Nations declared a state of famine in parts of the Upper Nile 
region. Hundreds of thousands of citizens in the northern territory of South 
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Sudan are thought to have migrated to Sudan in the last few years in search of 
security and better economic prospects. 
A political settlement—the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the 
Republic of South Sudan—was signed between the SPLM-In Government (SPLM-
IG) and SPLM-In Opposition (SPLM-IO) in August 2015 in Addis Ababa. This 
established the Transitional Government of National Unity, a government made 
up mostly of members of the two parties. Although implementation of this 
agreement commenced in April 2016, the lack of political capital and trust between 
parties caused it to fail. Deadly events ensued, as many had predicted, including 
shootouts at the state house in Juba. Riek Machar, a principal signatory to the 
agreement who represented the SPLM-IO, was driven from Juba and pursued into 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo by the SPLM-IG security loyalists. The 
SPLM-IO subsequently split into factions. Gen. Taban Deng Gai, Machar’s former 
chief negotiator, replaced him as the SPLM-IO’s lead implementer of the agreement 
in the Transitional Government. These events reignited the violence countrywide 
and essentially put the Transitional Government in a coma. The new round of 
war inflicted humanitarian and economic damage on the civil population. The 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the regional economic and security 
bloc, attempted to revitalize the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in 
South Sudan, but there was general skepticism about its ability to restore peace in 
the Republic of South Sudan. The Government and SPLM-IO eventually signed 
the Revitalized Agreement for the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of 
South Sudan in September 2018, which is currently being implemented. 
The war-engineered shocks to the economy and the population have had adverse 
consequences for South Sudan’s current and future economic outcomes. This has 
been especially disturbing for a country whose average spending on education 
before the war was a mere 5.8 percent of the annual budget (Mayai 2015). This 
paltry investment in education reflects the low priority the country’s leaders place 
on this essential constituent of economic development. In 2008, the number 
of citizens in South Sudan with a basic education was the lowest in the world, 
estimated at just 27 percent. The war exacerbated this appalling situation, posing 
the risk of both short- and long-term underdevelopment. These negative effects 
of the war on human capital accumulation are concerning, particularly in one 
of the least developed countries in modern history. Now that the war has ended, 
improved understanding of this experience will hopefully allow for informed, 
resilient policymaking. 
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HUMAN CAPITAL AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE
There is ample, if mixed, evidence on the economic costs of political violence. 
Numerous studies have found that political instability significantly reduces 
economic growth, as measured by the annual rate of change in gross domestic 
product (Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003; Alesina et al. 1996; Lai and Thyne 2007; 
Shields and Paulson 2015). Addison et al. (2015) found further that political 
violence threatens both human and social capital and weakens institutions. While 
examining changes in global education spending and enrollment over an 18-
year period (1980-1997), Lai and Thyne (2007) found that political instability 
reduces the amount of resources put into education and undermines a state’s 
ability to perform its basic functions, such as providing services. Looking at 
the relationship between conflict and schooling in sub-Saharan Africa, Poirier 
(2012) found that increasing schooling expenditures by 1 percent of the gross 
domestic product boosts enrollment and completion rates, and that an increase 
in military spending, which often occurs in conflict settings, reduces schooling 
in terms of the level attained.
Weldeegzie (2017) examined the impact of the Ethiopian-Eritrean war on a range 
of childhood outcomes, including schooling. He found that children exposed to 
war are likely to drop out of school, struggle with reading, and have relatively low 
overall educational attainment (Omoeva, Hatch, and Moussa 2016). León (2012) 
reported on the long-term effects political instability has had on educational 
attainment in Peru, where children exposed to war lost an average of 0.31 years 
of schooling as adults. Akresh and De Walque (2008) examined the effects the 
1994 Rwandan genocide had on schooling, finding that exposure to war reduced 
children’s education by half a year. Akbulut-Yuksel (2009), who assessed the impact 
of World War II on educational attainment in Germany, found that children 
exposed to the war lost an average of 0.4 years of schooling as adults; those who 
lived in the hardest hit locations lost an average of 1.2 years of schooling. Akbulut-
Yuksel also found that children who were exposed to war earned 6 percent less 
as adults than their peers who were not. In their analysis of the intergenerational 
effects of political violence, Akresh et al. (2017) found that individuals exposed to 
the Nigerian Civil War showed lower educational achievement. Finally, according 
to Guariso and Verpoorten (2013), Rwandan children exposed to war had an 18.5 
percent average reduction in total years of schooling.
The long-term effects of political violence on educational attainment varies by 
gender (Buvinić, Das Gupta, and Shemyakina 2013; Chamarbagwala and Morán 
2011). While it generally reduces the amount of schooling all children receive, it 
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has a different effect on boys than on girls (Burde et al. 2017; Diwakar 2015). In a 
study of the short- and long-term effects of violence on education in Timor Leste, 
Justino, Leóne, and Salardi (2014) found that the decline in human capital due 
to war was more pronounced among boys than girls. There are two presumable 
explanations for this difference. First, using male children as combatants is 
common in developing countries (Achvarina and Reich 2006), and Lai and Thyne 
(2007) found that boys’ education suffers more than girls’ during a civil war 
because boys are more likely to be conscripted. However, Kirk and Winthrop 
(2007) studied gender differences in schooling in Afghanistan, finding that the 
distance from home to school affects attendance for girls more than boys. They 
found similarly that, due to mistrust, parents are less likely to send their daughters 
to schools where the teaching staff is predominately men or outsiders. Attitudes 
and cultural constructs also tend to favor schooling for boys more than for girls 
(Kirk and Winthrop 2007; Burde et al. 2017). Østby, Urdal, and Rudolfsen (2016) 
noted that, as the quality of schooling declines as a result of war, girls’ enrollment 
declines significantly. Finally, the economic shocks of political violence are likely 
to alter boys’ role in the family, with some becoming the main providers (Buvinić 
et al. 2013). 
These studies provide some understanding of the impact political instability can 
have on human capital development. However, the question remains of how this 
impact translates into socioeconomic development outcomes at both the macro 
and micro level. Most economists agree that economic growth is positively and 
strongly associated with average years of schooling (Barro 1999) and that, by 
adopting up-to-date technologies, human capital development can accelerate 
economic growth (Barro 2001; Heckman and Carneiro 2003). Accordingly, a 
substantial reduction in schooling weakens a population’s opportunity to adopt 
new technologies. In developing countries, the more years of education a person 
has, the higher their eventual income: one additional year of primary education 
increases an individual adult’s wages by 10 percent (Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare 
1997; Mincer 1974). Conversely, as human capital declines due to conflict or related 
factors, so does average personal income. Perhaps most worrisome is that the 
negative consequences of war are often transmitted intergenerationally, which 
can impede the economic progress of future generations and even perpetuate 
political instability (Akresh et al. 2017; Bricker and Foley 2013; Cervantes-Duarte 
and Fernández-Cano 2016). 
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DATA AND METHODS
Although prior research helps to explain the impact of political violence on 
individual and national socioeconomic outcomes, it does not provide evidence 
of outcomes at the institutional level, such as a school. This study fills the gap 
by exploiting space variation in exposure to violence and estimating the impact 
the South Sudanese civil war had on primary school enrollment as a measure 
of human capital accumulation. We accomplished this objective by using the 
sampled schools as the primary units of analysis, with enrollment measured as 
the average number of children enrolled in each school between 2013 and 2016. 
The study covers the first four years of a civil war that ended in 2018.
Description of Data
The study used two secondary data sources, ACAPS and ACLED. ACAPS covers 
school enrollment and background, while the ACLED dataset documents conflict 
intensity over time and across the ten states. Each dataset is further detailed below. 
The ACAPS Dataset
Late in 2016, ACAPS, with support from UNICEF South Sudan, surveyed 
393 schools in South Sudan out of an initial sample of 400. The study was 
an institutional analysis focused on primary schools nationwide that covered 
functional and nonfunctional schools. The sample included both public (i.e., 
community and government run) and private primary schools. The survey was 
designed to educate policymakers about developing humanitarian interventions 
that would make primary education safe and sustainable, even as the war 
prevailed. The ACAPS data were used to assess how political instability and its 
proximate consequences, such as population displacement and macroeconomic 
shocks, influenced children’s education in South Sudan. The dataset came from a 
pool of randomly selected schools clustered in some of the country’s three regions 
and ten states; enrollment information was generated retrospectively, especially 
for the 2013-2015 period. 
The sampling strategy adopted was as follows. The study commenced with key 
informant interviews the study team conducted with education officials at the 
county level to inform a structured survey. The survey was preceded by team visits 
to some schools, the list of which was reconciled with Education Management 
Information System (EMIS) records. A nationally representative sample of four 
hundred schools was then randomly drawn from the more than five thousand 
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primary schools found in the EMIS database, a 7.3 percent representation. To 
draw this sample, the study team used a multistage clustering/stratification 
strategy. The first stage comprised South Sudan’s three regions: Equatoria, Bahr 
el Ghazal, and Upper Nile. The second stage involved urban and rural areas. 
Twenty counties were selected at the regional level; this meant that at least 30 
percent of the sample or two of the twenty counties were allocated to the urban 
segment of each region. The rest of the counties were chosen from rural settings 
and allocated in accordance with the total number of rural counties each region 
contains. The sample targeted schools were listed in the 2013-2015 EMIS database. 
This restriction induced a downward bias in enrollment, as it excluded schools 
that opened after this period. 
Owing to widespread insecurity, some schools could not be reached. When this 
occurred, the data-collection team’s strategy was to randomly select a school from 
the list, which was stratified by region and county, to replace the inaccessible 
schools. In total, 105 schools (26% of the sample) were replaced, with the final 
dataset adjusted for representativeness. Altogether, the team surveyed 393 primary 
schools out of the initial sample of 400, a response rate of more than 98 percent.
Key information was gathered about each school’s basic infrastructure and 
ownership, and whether it was functioning or closed. The survey also documented 
each school’s establishment date, the primary reason for closing (if no longer 
operational), and any institutional or governance support a school was receiving 
from partners, which were mostly international, such as the UK Department 
for International Development’s Girl Child Education Fund. Finally, the survey 
recorded information on enrollment at the start of each school year, the number of 
children who dropped out of school each year, the number of internally displaced 
and refugee children attending the school, the main reasons children dropped 
out of school, children’s exposure to violent attack or school occupation by armed 
groups, and size of the teaching staff, measured as the number of teachers available 
at the start of the most recent school year. 
Table 1 details the sample under analysis. The sample size is presented as school-
years (N=393 * 4=1,572).2 As noted, one principal objective of the ACAPS survey 
was to document how the civil war influenced primary education processes in 
South Sudan by looking at several indicators. Panel A shows school functionality 
2  Each school contributes four years of enrollment data. Taken together, the analysis used a total of 
1,572 school years. 
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and its key determinants, with conflict featuring prominently. More than 76 
percent of the 393 sampled schools were operating during the data collection. A 
vast majority of the schools no longer operating had been disrupted by the war; 
indeed, nearly 63 percent had closed primarily due to political instability. 
Panels B and C present information on school ownership and infrastructure. 
These variables are included in the analysis as correlates of functionality and 
enrollment. The present analysis indicates that community and government 
schools had higher rates of closure (37% and 23%, respectively) than private 
schools (15%); however, government schools constituted the majority, 65.8 percent, 
community schools 11 percent, and privately owned 23 percent. Infrastructure 
also played a statistically significant role in school functionality. Schools operating 
in permanent and semipermanent structures were two to five times more likely 
to be functional than schools operating in the open air or in mobile structures; 
they were distributed nearly evenly across categories (permanent structures 37.6%, 
semipermanent 38%, open air 23.4%; see Panel C). 
The size of the teaching staff and the number of internally displaced and refugee 
children at a school are important factors in understanding enrollment. The average 
sampled school had 9 teachers, with 23.4 IDPs and refugee children enrolled 
annually (see Panel D). A unit increase in either variable is positively associated 
with changes in enrollment; all else held constant, the positive relationship between 
enrollment and the size of the teaching staff remains. Although this might signify 
reverse causality more generally, there is little cause to believe this is the case in the 
South Sudanese context. In fact, a recent review of school enrollment nationwide 
showed faculty size falling as the rate of enrollment increased. This result calls for 
increased investment in recruiting and retaining teachers. 
Panels E, F, and G summarize enrollment. For the period under investigation, 
primary school enrollment averaged 464.5 children annually, nearly 267 boys 
and 196 girls. The average school enrolled 460 children in 2013 and about 466 
in 2016. Schools not directly exposed to political instability on average enrolled 
500 students a year, compared to an average of 460 for schools in conflict zones. 
During this period, 35.3 out of 100 boys dropped out of school each year, as did 31 
out of 100 girls. Panel G shows that 28.7 percent of the boys dropped out because 
of the war, whereas 22.9 percent of girls did so. Overall, political instability was 
the reason for 25.8 percent of dropouts from 2013 to 2016. 
Journal on Education in Emergencies13
MAYAI





Primary reason for not functioning
 Conflict related 62.64 228






Open air 24.35 376
Permanent 37.56 580
Semipermanent 38.08 588
Panel D: Teachers, IDPs, and refugees present
Number of teachers 9.01 1196




Boys [2013] 267.79 200
Boys [2016] 300.16 294
Girls 195.95 952
Girls [2013] 183.60 197
Girls [2016] 228.97 297
Not exposed to war 495.06 175 
Exposed to war 457.68 788 
2013 459.91 199
2016 465.66 764
Panel F: Dropout rates
Boys 35.29 1056
Girls 31.02 1044
Panel G: Reasons for dropping out, by gender
Boys
  Conflict related 28.74 300
  Others 71.26 744
Girls
  Conflict related 22.88 248
  Others 77.12 836
Note: Mean represents proportions and averages; N represents number of school 
years. Author’s calculations based on 2016 ACAPS data.
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Tables 2A and 2B summarize unadjusted changes in enrollment over the same 
four-year period. Both tables exploit spatial discontinuity in exposure to the 
conflict to estimate the average enrollment using the DD framework. The “before” 
estimates refer to 2013 (peacetime), whereas the “after” estimates refer to 2016 
(wartime). Notably, the war had a substantial effect on early education in South 
Sudan. Although enrollment generally declined in schools in the conflict zones, 
girls’ average registration increased by about 11 students per year. According to 
the pooled sample, each school in a war zone enrolled six fewer children a year 
on average, or roughly ten boys per school. However, by treating schools not 
exposed to war as counterfactuals, average enrollment for schools in war zones 
decreased by nearly 65 children annually (see Table 2A). Table 3 demonstrates 
further that the impact of war on schooling is greater for boys than for girls, as 
average enrollment for boys declined over the years by 48, and by only 22 for girls. 
Table 2A: Summary Statistics for Enrollment by Treatment
Not exposed to war Exposed to war
Before After Diff. Before After Diff. DD
Enrollment 450.0 508.8 58.8 462.5 456.5 -6.0 -64.7
[N=41] [N=134] [N=158] [N=630]
Note: Average enrollment rates and differences across periods and groups, a final difference between 
the two groups; sample size (N) in bracket. Author’s calculations based on ACAPS data. 
Table 2B: Summary Statistics for Enrollment by Sex and Treatment
Not exposed to war Exposed to war
Sex Before After Diff. Before After Diff. DD
Boys 278.9 317.6 38.7 265.0 255.5 -9.5 -48.2
[N=40] [N=134] [N=160] [N=617]
Girls 158.1 191.3 33.2 190.1 200.9 10.8 -22.4
[N=40] [N=134] [N=157] [N=621)
Note: Average enrollment rates and differences across periods and groups, a final difference between 
the two groups; sample size (N) in bracket. Author’s calculations based on ACAPS data. 
Data on Armed Conflict Events
Tables 3A and 3B summarize conflict intensity by treatment region over time 
using the ACLED dataset. This dataset details violent events, including date, 
actor, nature of violence, location, and deaths associated with these events. The 
ACLED data are matched with school-level data by using state and time period 
as identifiers. Analysis of the combined dataset helps assess the robustness of the 
regression estimates offered in Table 5.
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Table 3A: Conflict Intensity by Treatment
Not exposed to war Exposed to war
Year Mean SD Mean SD
2013 13.00 1.62 54.92 37.72
2014 25.71 7.35 133.15 75.40
2015 27.26 7.06 109.58 46.51
2016 49.97 29.25 151.82 99.92
N 248 1,320
Note: Mean represents average conflict events and SD stands for standard deviation. 
Table 3B: Conflict-Related Fatalities by Treatment
Not exposed to war Exposed to war
Year Mean SD Mean SD
2013 90.29 67.38 871.24 872.38
2014 165.94 148.17 761.07 709.98
2015 112.74 80.80 445.10 342.21
2016 178.45 154.18 572.52 410.26
N 248 1,320
Note: Mean represents average conflict events and SD stands for standard deviation. 
As Tables 3A and 3B illuminate, South Sudan’s human security became more 
fragile over time and was increasingly threatened by the country’s rapidly changing 
political climate. Before 2013, sporadic yet relatively small-scale communal conflicts 
had occurred; the situation worsened with the outbreak of the civil war in December 
2013. The number of these conflicts rose more than fourfold between 2013 and 2016, 
confirming the country’s deteriorating security situation during the war. 
The regions of South Sudan not directly affected by the war (i.e., northern Bahr el 
Ghazal, Warrap, Eastern Equatoria) averaged 13 conflict events in 2013; the number 
of events in these regions rose significantly in 2016, indicating the neighborhood 
effect of instability. In the regions directly affected by the war (i.e., western Bahr 
el Ghazal, Unity, Central Equatoria, Western Equatoria, Jonglei, Lakes, and Upper 
Nile), the average number of conflict events nearly tripled, from 54.9 in 2013 to 
151.8 in 2016. Notably, the warring zones already had a more volatile security 
environment before the outbreak of war than their unaffected counterparts, which 
undoubtedly signaled the spatial (i.e., state) heterogeneity in localized violence. This 
spatial heterogeneity at the baseline does not seem to drive differential effects on 
schooling, as our parallel assumption assessment results indicate. Moreover, besides 
violence-inducing local grievances, most states within the Greater Upper Nile and 
Equatoria regions suffered major bouts of politically aggravated insecurity. During 
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the period assessed (2013-2016), the politically volatile states experienced an average 
of 112.37 conflicts, while the less volatile states experienced only 28.98. 
The average number of fatalities during the war in South Sudan fluctuated over 
time, as shown in Table 3B, and did not seem to depend on how many conflict 
events a region endured. Nationally, each conflict event resulted in 7 deaths per 
100 population. Presenting this based on exposure to conflict, a single conflict 
accounted for 11 deaths per 100 population in nonconflict regions, and 6 deaths per 
100 civilians in conflict regions. Because these findings indicate that the frequency 
of conflict events generally evokes fear, the ensuing number of fatalities is likely to 
depend on the destructive nature of such events.
Connecting these results to education processes demonstrates that conflict is 
intimately associated with school closure. Two years, 2014 and 2016, experienced 
more conflict events than 2015, when the first peace agreement was signed. This is 
consistent with our estimates presented in Table 5, which point to a greater than 
15 percent reduction in school enrollment in 2014 alone; more than 62 percent of 
the schools not functioning in 2016 had closed due to the conflict. 
Description of Control Variables
Although the principal emphasis of this analysis is to complement existing knowledge 
on the adverse effects political instability has on the socioeconomic outcomes 
of individuals and societies, recognizing the role of other factors is imperative 
(Connelly and Zheng 2003; Tansel 2002). Deolalikar (1997), for example, highlighted 
the significance of infrastructure and other community-level constraints on school 
enrollment. In this study, we consider school-level or background factors, such as the 
size of the teaching staff, school infrastructure, ownership as a proxy for investment 
(i.e., spending on school), population shifts due to conflict or environmental shocks 
or both, fixed effects, and secular conditions. To ensure that the causal link between 
enrollment and war was adequately isolated, we conducted a series of robustness 
checks before estimating the final empirical model. We specifically assessed the 
roles the size of the teaching staff, infrastructure, and school ownership play in 
enrollment, as these variables significantly relate to a school’s functionality. The 
number of IDP and refugee children attending a school also factors into overall 
enrollment, but changes in enrollment can be a function of other invariant, 
unobserved conditions, which our analysis captures by using period and omitted 
fixed effects. 
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Without controlling for other variables, violence appears to be insignificantly related 
to enrollment, save for the boys’ subsample. Still, when other variables are not 
controlled for, the effect of political violence on enrollment in the boys’ sample is 
attenuated by 35 percent; however, the statistical relationship still holds at a less 
than 1 percent confidence level. This result indicates that controlling for other 
factors does not necessarily matter—war continues to play a fundamental role in 
the educational attainment of male children. This suggests the relative vulnerability 
of male children in situations of political instability. 
The war caused extensive social and economic troubles in South Sudan that have 
drastically reduced national and personal incomes, thus a number of measurement 
concerns is worth noting. The fear of violent attacks and substantial cuts in economic 
resources likely forced parents to pull their children out of school. However, our 
sample has no information on the economic determinants of enrollment, which 
challenges any attempt to accurately estimate the impact of war on enrollment, 
as children not directly exposed to conflict could still drop out of school due to 
war-related economic consequences (e.g., marked loss in household or family 
earnings). In other words, the influence of a rapidly deteriorating economy on 
household-level enrollment decisions cannot be ruled out. In addition, schools 
that closed because of the war are not included in the sample. If these schools 
stopped operating due to political insecurity, then the impact of war on enrollment 
is undoubtedly underestimated in this study. Finally, our analysis does not study 
whether students are generally gaining the skills or knowledge necessary to become 
productive members of society (Steer et al. 2014).
Identification Strategy
As noted elsewhere, the South Sudanese civil war erupted in Juba in mid-December 
2013 and spread quickly, especially to the Upper Nile region. Over the next five years, 
the war directly affected seven of the country’s ten former states, which induced 
widespread economic and physical insecurity among the population. These seven 
states include Western Bahr el Ghazal, Unity, Central Equatoria, Western Equatoria, 
Jonglei, Lakes, and Upper Nile. Lakes and Jonglei also suffered communal violence 
for nearly a decade, which was equally disruptive. The present analysis uses this 
spatial distribution of violence as the basis for its identification strategy. 
First, it should be noted that geography matters. A school’s location determines 
its exposure to the conflict. As such, primary schools situated in the seven states 
directly affected by the war constitute the treatment group. Those located in the 
other three states represent the control group. In other words, the current analysis 
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stratifies the sampled schools into locations exposed and not exposed to political 
conflict. A school located in a war zone is represented by 1, otherwise 0. Exploiting 
geography to determine exposure to war engenders the use of a DD approach to 
estimate the exogenous variation between enrollment and war. 
The DD methodology is particularly valuable in netting out time-invariant group 
differences. An additional strength of this estimation strategy is the assumption 
of no difference between the two groups prior to the introduction of a policy or 
occurrence of an event. In Table 4, we evaluate the hypothesis that the two groups 
of schools did not differ at baseline (i.e., 2013). This is performed by interacting 
two variables: period (year) and treatment (exposure to war). Enrollment—the 
dependent variable—is then evaluated as a function of an interaction term. Whether 
the difference between these groups truly exists is established if the interaction 
term that involves 2013 (prewar) and the war exposure is statistically significant. 
Evaluating such a spatial difference in enrollment is restricted to 2013, due to the 
lack of sufficient quality data for prior periods. As the results show, there is no 
evidence to suggest that the two groups differed before the outbreak of civil war. A 
t-test at baseline confirms the same story. Based on this evidence, no time-varying 
differences are observed between the two groups of schools. Therefore, any parallel 
trends observed following the outbreak of the conflict can be attributed to the 
conflict itself (see Figures 1, 2, and 3). 
Table 4: Parallel Trends Assumption Test
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Full sample Boys Girls
Exposed to war -27.61 -47.98 24.71
(53.39) (34.58) (27.74)
2016*War (base) - - -
2013*War 40.00 34.12 7.29
(79.12) (51.43) (41.33)
2014*War -66.91 -43.05 -30.06
(78.08) (50.57) (40.59)
2015*War -35.36 -15.64 -28.41
(76.45) (49.53) (39.74)
Observations 963 951 952
 Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
 * p<0.1
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Figure 1: Enrollment Trends, South Sudan, 2013-2016
Figure 2: Enrollment Trends for Boys, 2013-2016
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Figure 3: Enrollment Trends for Girls, 2013-2016
Similarly, using the ACLED data, we test how school enrollment responds to 
conflict intensity, measured as the number of conflict events and associated 
fatalities at a particular location over time. Although the relationship is not 
statistically significant, we find a negative association between conflict and 
enrollment, with each unit of conflict events reducing enrollment by 0.20 for 
the entire sample, 0.15 for boys, and 0.02 for girls. Finally, a unit increase in 
fatalities results in a reduction of 0.03 for the overall sample, 0.02 for boys, and 
0.01 for girls (see appendix for these results, Tables A1 and A2). 
Let E be a continuous measure of schooling or enrollment for school i, and δ the 
average causal impact of violence on schooling. Let us then evaluate the impact 
(δ) of war on such a measure using the linear, difference-in-differences equation 
below. This is an ordinary least squares procedure with enrollment specified as 
a linear function of war, net of background characteristics and school-level and 
period fixed effects. The fixed effects component accounts for both measured 
and omitted invariant variables, and accounting for these variables results in 
more reliable estimates. We estimate the models by first constructing a dummy 
variable representing two groups of schools, denoted by D. D equals 1 if the 
school is located in a state directly exposed to the war, otherwise 0. The average 
causal effect of war on schooling then becomes 
δ =  1 ∑ [Eit|D = 1–Eit|D = 0],n
n
i=1
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with the ∑ sign representing the summation of enrollment over the entire sample 
for the duration of the conflict this analysis is evaluating. Transforming this 
equation into a linear regression model that nets out the influence of other factors 
produces  
 Eist=αi+ β(Xis) + δ(War exposure)+ γt + εt,
where X represents a set of background variables that do not vary over time but 
whose values vary across schools. War exposure is an indicator of whether the 
school is located in a state affected by war (treatment status), and year represents 
the periods over which the enrollment is being investigated. Because the DD 
methodology allows individual sample points to act as their own controls, α 
denotes the school-level fixed effects (Allison 2009). β represents the coefficients 
of background variables, and δ is the causal impact of war on enrollment, which is 
represented by E, as noted above. The δ is considered to be additive and constant 
(Angrist and Pischke 2009), γ estimates the year fixed effects, and ε accounts 
for random disturbances or unobserved characteristics of individual schools 
(Imbens and Woolridge 2009). Enrollment is not only a continuous measure of 
time dimension; it also varies across schools and is measured as the number of 
children enrolled in a school at the beginning of each school year. Thus, holding 
other factors constant, including time-invariant omitted variables, the impact of 
war on enrollment is estimated for school i in state s at time t, respectively. Using 
2013 as the base period, average enrollment is estimated for 2016, the last period.
Background variables include school infrastructure, ownership, size of the faculty, 
and the presence of IDP and refugee children. Infrastructure is defined as open 
air, permanent, and semipermanent. School ownership is defined as community, 
government, and private. Faculty size is defined as the average number of teaching 
staff available at the start of a school year. IDPs and refugees are defined as the 
number of IDP and refugee children attending the school during the school year. 
The information on faculty size and the number of IDPs and refugees is for the 
most recent period and, as such, the impact of those variables on enrollment is 
assumed to be constant over time.
The National Bureau of Statistics of South Sudan uses neighborhood-based 
census tracts (clusters) to generate data for population-based studies. The ten 
states make up some of the clusters the bureau has defined and used to generate 
spatially representative samples. The present sample was drawn using these state-
distributed tracts. To adjust for standard errors, we take into account the clustering 
effects by treating individual states as independent groups in which schools are 
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located. Although the clusters are considered independent, schools within them 
are likely to have similar experiences; this leads to local dependence that could 
influence the statistical tests of significance. 
Lastly, we note some methodological flaws. This work does not take into account 
the household determinants of enrollment, as the necessary data are absent. 
Therefore, we are unable to isolate the impact of war from other essential factors 
in determining enrollment. For example, an economic downturn associated 
with political instability is likely to have a bearing on a household’s decision 
to continue educating the children, especially the boys (Justino et al. 2014). 
Late payment of civil servants’ salaries also was exacerbated by the war; those 
serving in the police and education sectors waited as long as eight months to 
be paid (Mayai et al. 2017). This situation certainly impacts these households’ 
ability to keep their children in school, and since the current analysis is at the 
individual school level, students’ fixed effects could not be measured. Moreover, 
the communal conflicts that permeated most of South Sudanese society would 
likely have effects on education processes and general stability comparable to a 
national conflict. Lack of relevant data on communal conflict hinders our ability 
to discriminate between the impact of communal violence and violence that is 
politically motivated. Inaccessible schools are not included in the sample, resulting 
in additional bias. Finally, enrollment statistics are not a strong measure of school 
quality, so even if their school remains operational, children in conflict-affected 
areas are likely to receive poor quality instruction. The best teachers often seek 
jobs in a conflict-free area, and students who appear on a school roster may not 
attend classes regularly, due to a lack of security.
RESULTS
In this section, we estimate the impact of political violence on primary school 
enrollment. The treatment effect of the war on schooling is presented using three 
separate models: full sample, boys, and girls. This stratification is necessary, as 
there is a proven gender dimension to the influence of war on socioeconomic 
outcomes, particularly in education. We use the full sample to estimate the 
universal causal impact of war on schooling, producing results that are ideally 
generalizable at the population level. This is in accordance with the assumption 
that the effects of war are often far reaching. Gender-stratified evidence is desired, 
as it could be used to support targeted policies. South Sudan National Gender 
Policy (sec. 3.2) advances the importance of education in the empowerment of 
both men and women for sustainable socioeconomic development (MGCSW 
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2012). Table 5 reveals instructive results, net of school background characteristics, 
individual fixed effects, and period fixed effects. It shows that primary schools 
exposed to the war suffered a substantial decline in enrollment. The impact is 
particularly pronounced for male children. These results reflect the direction 
of our key hypotheses: that we expect school enrollment to decline in locations 
directly exposed to war, and that this impact is more pronounced for male than 
female children, due to the gendered political economy of war (i.e., boys are often 
conscripted) and sociocultural factors (i.e., there is less focus on educating girls than 
boys). While some universal aspects of the influence of war are generally expected, 
the education of young boys suffers more, for reasons previously discussed. 
The effect on enrollment at schools caught in the war is especially notable and 
statistically significant for the first two models. For the full sample, we find that 
schools exposed to war lost 85 children on average per annum. Considering that 
the threat of war was constant during the four years of our study, the overall 
impact amounted to a loss of 340 children per school (73.9% of enrollment) 
during the conflict window, which is a vast proportion of the average enrollment. 
Table 5: Primary School Enrollment and Political Violence
(1) (2) (3)
Predictor variable Full sample Boys Girls




Government 92.73*** 63.79*** 24.89
(23.36) (13.43) (20.57)




Permanent 84.70** 55.34** 35.72*
(33.24) (22.43) (17.53)
Semipermanent 41.52 29.72* 16.15
(26.70) (16.11) (15.04)
Number of teachers 27.38*** 10.41*** 14.93***
(1.28) (2.68) (1.42)
Number of IDPs and refugees 1.21*** 1.05*** 0.23
Year  
[ref=2013]
2014 -72.26 -47.90 -20.23
(62.79) (38.29) (26.52)
2015 0.85 -3.48 9.68
(59.61) (37.14) (24.66)
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2016 72.82 37.74 46.82
(48.32) (28.33) (26.71)
Observations 945 933 934
 Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
There is a statistically significant relationship between the number of boys who 
dropped out of primary school and those who experienced war. For our sample, 
the average enrollment per year decreased by 80.5 boys, or 30 percent of total 
enrollment. For girls the impact was rather modest, a decrease of 8.8 per year, 
and was insignificantly related to war at all conventional significance levels. There 
are several possible reasons for this gender disparity. One is that boys are often 
conscripted into the army (Lai and Thyne 2007), and child soldiering affects 
the vast majority of young boys in South Sudan (Fegley 2008). Second, boys are 
often sent to safe locations, both for safety and educational opportunities. Lai 
and Thyne (2007) described the experience of the Sudanese “Lost Boys,” the 
more than 20,000 orphaned or displaced youth who were sent to various East 
African countries to get an education. Since the start of the conflict in South 
Sudan, at least one-third of the population has been displaced, a vast majority 
of them children and women (IPC 2017). Most refugee and IDP encampments 
offer educational opportunities these days. This is great news for South Sudan, 
as it helps to minimize their lost opportunities. 
Traditional norms dictate that girls in South Sudan are rarely exploited for 
waging war. Girls are among the members of society considered most vulnerable, 
along with adult females, young children, and the elderly. Owing to the cultural 
expectation that these vulnerable members of the community should be protected 
from violence, girls are often relocated to safe places where they can continue their 
schooling. However, girls’ enrollment in South Sudan schools is lower than boys’, 
and where enrollment is low in general (i.e., for girls and boys), the war’s impact 
on schooling is usually negligible (Shields and Paulson 2015). Distance between 
home and school also plays an important role in girls’ and boys’ attendance. In 
Afghanistan, for example, the distance to school influences girls’ attendance more 
than it does boys’ (Kirk and Winthrop 2007). Kirk and Winthrop (2007) note 
that sociocultural factors, such as early marriage and domestic obligations and 
being relegated to doing housekeeping and child care, play a role in young girls’ 
school attendance, which stymies their educational progress. 
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DISCUSSION
This analysis explores the role the civil war in South Sudan has played on primary 
school enrollment as a measure of human capital accumulation. The civil war in 
the world’s newest country caused significant shocks to its economy, creating the 
direst humanitarian conditions in the state’s brief history. Hundreds of thousands 
of people were killed during the war and millions displaced, while nearly half 
the population suffered food insecurity (Checchi et al. 2018). The state’s capacity 
to deliver basic services was significantly weakened, the economy deteriorated, 
and primary school enrollment experienced a drastic reduction in the 2013-2016 
period. The damaging nature of war, especially its impact on the economy, calls 
for improved policy regimes, including the imperative to address the long-term 
ramifications of war for the younger generation. 
Using quasi-experimental frameworks by exploiting space-specific exposure to 
violence, we find a strong relationship between primary school enrollment and 
political instability in South Sudan, with schools in conflict zones losing on average 
nearly one hundred children per year. This adverse effect is particularly pertinent 
for boys. The decrease in girls’ enrollment is not necessarily tied to exposure to 
political violence, which suggests that gender differentiation in enrollment could be 
associated with a host of other forces. For example, conscription of young boys is 
an enduring problem in South Sudan (Burde et al. 2017; Lai and Thyne 2007). Our 
analysis indicates that sociocultural circumstances, including gendered domestic 
functions, poverty, early marriage, and pregnancy, all negatively impact girls’ 
education. Therefore, the enrollment of girls, preconflict or otherwise, is expected 
to be lower than for boys, making the conflict less impactful for girls. As such, 
external interventions can give girls an advantage by reducing the impact of war 
on their learning activities and simultaneously addressing these other sociocultural 
barriers. Increased investment in girls’ education from donors and NGOs such as 
Girls Education South Sudan is important in enabling such an advantage.
This research is important due to its unique approach to examining the impact of 
war on school enrollment. Given the complex ways the impact of war manifests, 
evidence of its impact at the institutional level is needed to develop policies that 
target institutions. This study evaluated education processes in emergencies using 
the DD framework, and the results show that schools in the conflict-battered states 
of South Sudan lost an average of 85 schoolchildren annually, which constitutes 
18.5 percent of average enrollment. A vast majority of young people exposed to 
the conflict currently have limited ability to find meaningful work in a rapidly 
evolving postwar labor market. 
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This analysis presents a causal impact of political violence on education in a 
relatively new context, South Sudan. Policymakers and political leaders may use 
this evidence to improve planning for education during emergencies. Although 
community safety as a whole is paramount during emergencies, the present 
findings suggest that increased efforts to secure primary education attendance 
during conflicts could lower the short- and long-term socioeconomic costs of 
political instability. Guaranteeing safe learning facilities should be an integral 
part of local, regional, and international relief agendas. For example, increasing 
education funding for displaced South Sudanese children will strengthen the 
nation’s future capacity. Evidence from the South Sudan School Attendance 
Management System shows that Girls Education South Sudan grants to primary 
schools were associated with a 401 percent increase in enrollment, even as 
the war prevailed. Preventing schools from being destroyed or occupied and 
keeping teachers and children safe should be a main priority of any intervention 
(Guariso and Verpoorten 2013; Akbulut-Yuksel 2009). There is also a pressing 
need to guarantee the safety of young boys, in particular by strengthening and 
enforcing local and international child labor laws that address the problem of 
child soldiering. 
In states grappling with violent conflict, policymakers and political leaders 
often scramble to negotiate political settlements as a way to end instability and 
establish a point of departure for reconstruction (Kreutz 2010; Mason et al. 2011; 
Högbladh 2011). A return to stability demands distinct policy options that foster 
an encompassing reconstruction process. Though nearly every aspect of rebuilding 
is considered a priority in a postconflict environment, policymakers must target 
investment programs with an eye toward long-term development. An inclusive, 
predictable economic recovery program must include children’s timely return to 
school (Albertyn et al. 2003). Moreover, with or without war, education programs 
must address the wide gender gaps in schooling in South Sudan, as bridging 
the gap will ultimately lead to improved economic development for all (Kirk 
and Winthrop 2007). Finally, providing educational opportunities for a greater 
number of children will not sustain growth and political stability (Bricker and 
Foley 2013; NBS 2010; Urdal 2006) unless the country’s educated youth are also 
given opportunities for gainful employment. Thus, increasing school enrollment 
must be accompanied by integrated policies that align education with improved 
youth employment prospects (Barakat and Urdal 2009; Bricker and Foley 2013). 
If South Sudan fails to do this, it risks breeding a new legion of educated rebels 
(LaGraffe 2012; Hoffman and Jamal 2012; Steer et al. 2014; Bricker and Foley 
2013; Hilker 2011). 
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APPENDIX
Table A1: Regression Results (conflict episodes)
(1) (2) (3)
Variables Full sample Boys Girls
Conflict event -0.20 -0.15 -0.02
(0.16) (0.11) (0.08)
State controls Yes Yes Yes
Year controls Yes Yes Yes
School level controls Yes Yes Yes
IDPs Yes Yes Yes
Observations 945 933 934
R-squared 0.36 0.27 0.33
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
Table A2: Regression Results (fatalities)
(1) (2) (3)
Variables Full sample Boys Girls
Fatalities -0.03 -0.02 -0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
State controls Yes Yes Yes
Year controls Yes Yes Yes
School level controls Yes Yes Yes
IDPs Yes Yes Yes
Observations 945 933 934
R-squared 0.37 0.27 0.33
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
